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April 5, 2017 
In 2014 the United States, European Union 
(EU), and several other countries imposed eco-
nomic sanctions on Russia in response to its an-
nexation of Crimea and support for separatist 
rebels in eastern Ukraine (Nelson, 2017; Europa, 
2017). Prior to the 1990s, the use of economic 
sanctions to challenge the behavior of foreign 
governments was fairly rare as the target coun-
try could easily turn to the cold-war adversary of 
the sanctioning country to avoid their effects. 
With the end of the Cold War, sanctions, usually 
comprehensive in nature restricting economic 
relations across the board, became a major for-
eign policy tool. Because comprehensive sanc-
tions had severe negative impacts on ordinary 
citizens, the international community has shift-
ed its approach to “targeted” sanctions that pe-
nalize specific individuals and organizations as 
well as non-essential sectors, such as petroleum 
or financial services as opposed to essential 
goods such as food and medical supplies 
(Peterson and Haugen, 2016). The sanctions on 
Russia follow this pattern freezing assets and 
restricting transactions of particular individuals, 
banks, and firms allied with Russian President 
Vladimir Putin as well as trade in goods related 
to the petroleum industry and military arms 
(Nelson, 2017). 
In response to these actions, the Russian govern-
ment banned the importation of agricultural 
and food products, including fruits, vegetables, 
meat, fish, and dairy products, from the Western  
Market Report  Year 
Ago  4 Wks Ago  4-3-17 
Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average          
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .  *  124.76  124.00 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .  193.84  164.82  166.78 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .  158.93  131.26  137.77 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  226.62  205.86  217.15 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  61.97  68.19  60.99 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76.02  80.81  75.47 
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn, 
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .  132.01  140.48  145.56 
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  346.31  336.71  347.91 
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices          
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.87  3.33  2.84 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.42  3.25  3.34 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .  8.56  9.32  8.47 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5.61  5.19  5.17 
Oats, No. 2, Heavy 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2.42  2.95  2.90 
Feed          
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .  200.00  117.50  128.75 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  77.50  65.00  67.50 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .  85.00  65.00  65.00 
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  127.50  97.00  100.50 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52.00  40.75  42.50 
 ⃰ No Market          
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countries that had imposed the economic sanctions 
(The Guardian, 2014). Both the Russian ban on im-
ported food and the U.S. and EU sanctions have been 
extended to at least the end of 2017. The Russian econ-
omy has been slowed by lower petroleum prices as well 
as the effects of the economic sanctions. The economic 
slowdown in Russia can be seen in the figures in Table 
1, which show a decline of real Gross National Income 
(GNI) of 3.0 percent and a decrease in real per capita 
GNI of 3.3 percent between 2014 and 2015.   
Russia has become an important player in global agri-
cultural markets. In 2016, it was the third largest wheat 
exporter after the EU and United States (ERS, 2017).  
Russian food and agricultural imports are much great-
er than its exports of these commodities, as shown in 
Table 1. According to the European Commission, 19 
percent of Russia’s agricultural exports were destined 
for the EU, while 42 percent of its agricultural imports 
were from the EU in 2013 (Leifert and Leifert, 2015). 
The impact of the Russian ban on EU agricultural ex-
ports to Russia can be seen in Table 2, which shows 
that in 2015, the value of EU agricultural exports to 
Russia had fallen by 53 percent from the level reached 
in 2013. 
The effects of the Russian ban on U.S. agricultural ex-
ports is illustrated in Table 3. Compared to 2013, U.S. 
agricultural exports to Russia had fallen by almost 80 
percent by 2016. The Russian ban has eliminated its 
imports of some of the more important commodities 
exported to Russia by the United States, including 
poultry, beef, and pork, while reducing significantly 
other important U.S. exports, such as those of tree 
nuts and live animals. On the other hand, the Russian 
market has long been less important for U.S. food and 
agricultural producers than is the case in the EU. 
While 2013 Russian imports represented about 10 per-
cent of total EU agricultural exports to countries out-
side the EU, Russian imports from the United States 
have historically accounted for less than one percent of 
total U.S. agricultural exports. 
Given the relative insignificance of Russian purchases 
of U.S. agricultural products, the import ban has 
caused little harm to the U.S. agricultural sector. For 
the EU, on the other hand, Russia is the second most 
important market for agricultural products after the 
United States and the import embargo has been of 
greater consequence there. In 2015, European farmers 
protested low prices brought on, in part, by the Rus- 
sian embargo (BBC, 2015). By one estimate, the 
Russian import ban is costing EU farmers about 
5.5 billion euro (about $5.9 billion) in lost exports 
each year (Michalopolous, 2016).  
In addition, given the importance of European 
food imports for Russian consumers, the import 
ban has had serious domestic consequences. Rus-
sian consumers are facing increased food prices 
and shortages of specialized food items. According 
to data from the World Bank (2017), consumer 
prices in Russia rose by almost 26 percent between 
2013 and 2015 and much of this increase was due 
to higher food prices. Within just three months of 
the start of the import ban, Russian food prices 
had increased by 10 percent (Petrick, 2015). The 
Russian economy was also set back in 2014 by the 
drop in oil prices as petroleum is Russia’s leading 
export. Finally, these adverse economic develop-
ments caused the Russian ruble to depreciate by 58 
percent between 2014 and the end of 2016 making 
all imported goods more expensive (IMF, 2017). 
Following the global food price increases and other 
disruptions of world food trade in 2007-2010, the 
Russian government sought to increase food self-
sufficiency by stimulating domestic production 
and reducing exports (Leifert and Leifert, 2015). 
The decision to ban agricultural imports from the 
West was a natural response given these objectives. 
Petrick (2015) describes various structural prob-
lems in the Russian agricultural sector that make it 
unlikely that the import ban coupled with policy 
interventions in the domestic market will be suffi-
cient to bring about dramatic increases in the de-
gree of food self-sufficiency. This hypothesis is re-
inforced by the fact that the negative impacts of 
the food import ban on domestic markets have 
forced the Russian government to seek out new 
trading partners. For example, Russian imports 
from Pakistan, Serbia, and Egypt, as well as coun-
tries in Latin American, such as Chile, Argentina, 
and Brazil have grown dramatically (World Food 
Moscow, 2017a). There is also evidence that some 
EU products are being smuggled into Russia from 
neighboring EU members such as Poland, Latvia 
and Lithuania and legal food exports from Belarus 
that are derived from raw materials from the EU 
may help to ease the food shortages (Liefert & 
Liefert 2015). 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
GNI, billion  
constant 2010 $ 
  
1,478 
  
1,541 
  
1,592 
  
1,606 
  
1,622 
  
1,573 
Per capita GNI  
constant 2010 $ 
  
10,245 
  
10,777 
  
11,116 
  
11,191 
  
11,103 
  
10,741 
Merchandise  
imports, billion $ 
  
229.7 
  
305.6 
  
314.2 
  
315.0 
  
286.7 
  
182.7 
Merchandise  
exports, billion $ 
  
397.7 
  
516.5 
  
525.4 
  
527.3 
  
497.9 
  
343.5 
Agricultural  
imports, billion $ 
  
32.4 
  
44.6 
  
47.6 
  
40.3 
  
42.3 
  
27.8 
Agricultural exports, 
billion $ 
  
5.8 
  
9.2 
  
14.1 
  
13.7 
  
16.3 
  
13.9 
Table 1: Russian Economy 
Source: World Bank (2017) and UN at: (https://comtrade.un.org/pb/downloads/2015/ITSY2015VolII.pdf)  
Table 2: EU Agri-Food Exports (million €) 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 
EU Agri-food Exports to Russia 12,150 9,254 5,624 5,707 
EU Food Exports to Russia 10,996 8,290 4,734 4,803 
Total EU Agri-food Export 120,000 121,900 129,200 -- 
EU Agri-food Exports to Russia as % 
of total 
10.13 7.59 4.35 -- 
Source: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113440.pdf  
Note: On March 21, 2017, one euro equaled about $1.08. 
  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Bulk commodities 99 230 245 235 95 
   soy beans 46 157 184 189 58 
   tobacco 40 41 30 41 35 
  other 13 32 31 5 2 
Consumer-oriented 1,178 724 502 99 90 
   tree nuts 124 172 69 13 8 
   poultry 310 310 144 0 0 
   beef 299 1 1 0 0 
   pork 268 18 136 1 0 
  other 177 223 152 85 82 
Intermediate goods 378 254 152 91 65 
   live animals 267 149 49 17 1 
   other 111 105 103 74 64 
Total to Russia 1,655 1,208 900 426 250 
Total U.S. agricultural 
exports 
  
141,550 
  
144,356 
  
149,983 
  
133,053 
  
134,889 
Exports to Russia as % of 
total 
  
1.17 
  
0.84 
  
0.60 
  
0.32 
  
0.19 
 Table 3: U.S. Agricultural Exports to Russia (million current dollars) 
Source: https://apps.fas.usda.gov/gats/ExpressQuery1.aspx, Foreign Agriculture Service, GATS. 
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